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ABSTRACT 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are a group of etiologically diverse viral diseases unified by common underlying 
pathophysiology. These febrile diseases result from infection by viruses from four viral families: Arenaviridae, 
Bunyaviridae, Filoviridae, and Flaviviridae. The viruses in the four families are all RNA viruses. All share the feature of 
having a lipid envelope. Survival and perpetuation of the viruses is dependent on an animal host known as a natural 
reservoir, but humans are not the natural reservoir. With the exception of a vaccine for yellow fever and ribavirin, which is 
used for treatment of some arenaviral infections, no specific chemotherapy for viral hemorrhagic fever exists. Only 
supportive treatment is possible  The filoviruses, Marburg virus (MARV) and Ebola virus (EBOV), have been associated 
with hemorrhagic fever (HF) that produce severe disease and high mortality rates among infected humans and non-human 
primates. MARV and EBOV are also considered potential biological weapons. Although much progress has been made in 
developing preventive vaccines and postexposure interventions that can protect laboratory animals and nonhuman primates 
against lethal challenge with MARV, none of these has been approved for humans.  Because MARV haemorrhagic fever, 
when it occurs, has the potential to spread to other people especially health care staff and family members who care for the 
patient, there is need for periodic review of recent developments relating especially to its diagnosis and treatment. This 
would help to increase awareness among health-care providers and limit the spread of the disease during outbreaks.  
Keywords: Marburg virus, viral haemorrhagic fever, recent advances  
 
Background 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are a group of 
etiologically diverse viral diseases unified by 
common underlying pathophysiology. These febrile 
diseases result from infection by viruses from four 
viral families: Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, 
Filoviridae, and Flaviviridae. The viruses in the four 
families are all  RNA viruses. All share the feature 
of having a lipid envelope. Survival and 
perpetuation of the viruses is dependent on an 
animal host known as a natural reservoir, but 
humans are not the natural reservoir. With the 
exception of a vaccine for yellow fever and 
ribavirin, which is used for treatment of some 
arenaviral infections, no specific chemotherapy for 
viral hemorrhagic fever exists. Only supportive 
treatment is possible (1). 
The filoviruses, Marburg virus (MARV) and Ebola 
virus (EBOV), have been associated with 
hemorrhagic fever (HF) that produce severe disease 
and high mortality rates among infected humans 
and non-human primates (2). MARV and EBOV are 
also considered potential biological weapons. 
Although much progress has been made in 
developing preventive vaccines and postexposure 
interventions that can protect laboratory animals 
and nonhuman  
 
primates against lethal challenge with MARV, none 
of these has been approved for humans (3). 
 
History 
MARV was first identified during simultaneous 
outbreaks in 1967 when infected monkeys, imported 
from the Lake Kyoga region of Uganda, transmitted 
the virus to laboratory workers and scientists at 
facilities in Marburg and Frankfurt, Germany and 
Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia ( 3,4). The 
persons affected had contact with the blood or 
tissues of monkeys or with other infected persons. 
Other Marburg haemorrhagic fever epidemics 
which have occurred since then include one from 
October 1998 through September 2000 in Durba, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (5). The outbreak 
involved 154 patients (48 confirmed and 106 
suspected cases); the case fatality ratio was 83% (6).  
 
In March 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) investigated a large HF outbreak 
in Uige Province in northern Angola, West Africa. 
In total, 15 initial specimens were sent to CDC, 
Atlanta, for testing for viruses associated with viral 
HFs known to be present in West Africa, including 
Ebola virus. Marburg virus was also included 
despite the fact that the origins of all earlier 
outbreaks were linked directly to East Africa. 
Surprisingly, Marburg virus was confirmed (12 of 
15 specimens) as the cause of the outbreak. The 
outbreak likely began in October 2004 and ended in 





fatalities (report from the Ministry of Health, 
Republic of Angola, 2005), making it the largest 
Marburg HF outbreak on record (7). Two smaller 
outbreaks occurred in 2007 and 2008 in Uganda and 
the Netherlands respectively. The outbreak in 
Uganda involved 2 cases, one fatal, in young males 
working in Lead and gold mine in Kamwenge 
District, Uganda. The latter case, which was fatal, 
involved a 40-year-old Dutch woman in the 
Netherlands with a recent history of travel to the 
Python Cave, Uganda (3). On February 9, 2009, it 
was reported that in January 2008, a US Citizen 
from Colorado was the first patient treated in the 
United States for Marburg. The patient had 
contracted the virus while overseas in Uganda and 
traveled back to the USA, where she was later 
treated successfully for the infection (8). 
 
Aetiology  
Marburg virus, or simply Marburg, is the common 
name for the genus Marburgvirus which contains 
one species: Lake Victoria marburgvirus. The virus 
causes the disease Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever 
(MHF), also referred to as Marburg Virus Disease, 
and previously also known as Green Monkey 
Disease due to its primate origin. Marburg 
originated in Central and East Africa, and infects 
both human and nonhuman primates. The Marburg 
Virus is in the same taxonomic family as Ebola, and 
both are identical structurally although they elicit 
different antibodies (8). The two viruses comprise 
the family Filoviridae, order Mononegavirales 
(Peters and Khan, 1999 9). MARV is a single species 
consisting of viruses differing from one another by 
up to 21% at the nucleotide level. For instance, 
during the epidemics which occurred from 1998 to 
2000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, at least 
nine genetically distinct lineages of the virus were 




Plate 1: Marburg virus particles (Appro  
ximately 100,000x magnification).  
Adapted from  
species.wikimedia.org/wikifiloviridae 
 
In contrast, four distinct species of ebolavirus (Zaire, 
Sudan, Reston, and Ivory Coast) have been defined, 
which differ genetically from one another by 
approximately 37 to 41% (9). The structure of 
MARV is typical of filoviruses, with long threadlike 
particles which have a consistent diameter but vary 
greatly in length from an average of 800 to 14,000 
nanometers (nm), with peak infectious activity at 
about 790 nm (Plate 1). Marburg virus contains a 
single molecule of linear negative-sense, 19.1 kb 
single-stranded RNA whose seven gene products 
are, in order, nucleoprotein (NP), VP35, VP40, 
glycoprotein (GP), VP30, VP24, and the polymerase 
(L) (10).  
 
Epidemiology and Ecology of Marburg Virus 
Haemorrhagic Fever 
Outbreaks of Marburg are centered in Africa, where 
the natural reservoir is believed to be located. 
Historically, sources of MARV were confined to 
East Africa. They had been centered almost 
exclusively within 500 miles of Lake Victoria, with 
the exception of a single case in Zimbabwe in 1975, 
when a traveler became infected and seeking 
medical treatment, subsequently transmitted the 
virus to a health care worker in South Africa. This 
previous close association of MARV with East 
Africa contrasts with the observed distribution of 
EBOV,which has caused human HF outbreaks 
throughout tropical Africa, ranging from 
Coted’Ivoire to Uganda. However, a large MARV 
HF outbreak occurred in Uige Province in northern 
Angola, West Africa in 2005 (7).  
 
MARV and EBOV HF outbreaks are generally 
thought to involve the relatively rare introduction of 
the virus into the human population followed by 
waves of human-to-human transmission (usually 
through close contact with infected individuals or 
their body fluids) (31). Although the environmental 
reservoir of MARV was previously unknown (CDC, 
2005 11), in a study carried out to determine 
reservoir hosts for MARV in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, the fauna of a mine which was 
associated with a protracted outbreak of Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever during 1998 to 2000 were 
examined and MARV nucleic acid was found in 12 
bats, comprising of two species of insectivorous bat 
and one species of fruit bat. Antibodies to the virus 
were also detected in the serum of some of the 
insectivorous and fruit bat species, but attempts to 
isolate virus were unsuccessful (17). Pourrut et 
al.,2009 (30) also suggested, based on results of their 
studies, that the bat species  Rousettus aegyptiacus 
may be involved in the natural cycle of both 
Marburg and Ebola viruses. 
 
Transmission and Pathogenesis of Marburg 
Haemorrhagic Fever 
Marburg virus is transmitted by direct contact with 
the blood, body fluids and tissues of infected 
persons. Transmission of the Marburg virus also 
occurred by handling ill or dead infected wild 
animals (monkeys, fruit bats) (3). After gaining 
access to the body, filoviruses initially infect 
monocytes, macrophages and other cells of the 
mononuclear phagocytic system (MPS), probably in 
regional lymph nodes. Some infected MPS cells 






the lymph or bloodstream infect fixed and mobile 
macrophages in the liver, spleen and other tissues 
throughout the body. Virions released from these 
MPS cells proceed to infect neighboring cells, 
including hepatocytes, adrenal cortical cells and 
fibroblasts (12).  
Infected MPS cells become activated and release 
large quantities of cytokines and chemokines, 
including TNF-, which increases the permeability of 
the endothelial lining of blood vessels. Endothelial 
cells apparently become infected by virus only in 
the later stages of disease. Circulating cytokines 
contribute to the development of disseminated 
intravascular coagulation (DIC) by inducing 
expression of endothelial cell-surface adhesion and 
procoagulant molecules and tissue destruction 
results in the exposure of collagen in the lining of 
blood vessels and the release of tissue factor (12). 
Massive lysis of lymphocytes occurs in the spleen, 
thymus and lymph nodes in the late stages of 
filovirus infection. There is no sign that the 
lymphocytes themselves are infected, rather they 
die through apoptosis, perhaps induced by cell-
surface binding of chemical mediators released by 
MPS cells or by a viral protein. Massive cytolysis, 
immune dysfunction, fluid shifts, microvascular 
coagulation and interstitial hemorrhage all play a 
role in the development of shock and death (12). 
 
Clinical Signs and Prognosis of Marburg 
Haemorrhagic Fever 
Filovirus infections, in general, are the most severe 
of the viral hemorrhagic fevers. After an incubation 
period of 4 to 10 days, to a maximum of three weeks 
( 13Jeffs, 2006), infected individuals abruptly 
develop flu-like symptoms characterized by fever, 
chills, malaise, and myalgia. Approximately the fifth 
day after onset of symptoms, a maculopapular rash 
might occur, after which patients usually develop 
other signs and symptoms that indicate systemic 
involvement, such as prostration and 
gastrointestinal (anorexia, nausea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, and diarrhea), respiratory (chest 
pain, shortness of breath, and cough), vascular 
(conjunctival injection, postural hypotension, and 
edema), and neurological (headache, confusion, 
delirium and coma) manifestations (11). 
 
The target organ in the VHF syndrome is the 
vascular bed; correspondingly, the dominant 
clinical features are usually a consequence of 
microvascular damage and changes in vascular 
permeability. Bleeding is manifested as petechiae, 
ecchymosis, uncontrolled oozing from venipuncture 
sites and gingiva, mucosal hemorrhages, and 
bloody diarrhea. In later stages, the general 
condition of patients deteriorates due to multiorgan 
failure, including disseminated intravascular 
coagulopathy, resulting in death (11,14). If a patient 
survives, recovery is usually prompt and complete, 
though it may be prolonged in some cases, with 
inflammation or secondary infection of various 
organs, including: orchitis, hepatitis, transverse 
myelitis, uveitis, and parotitis. Recovered patients 
often have little or no memory of being sick, though 
only 10-40% survive (16). Case fatality rates of 
Marburg haemorrhagic fever have varied greatly, 
from 25% in the initial laboratory-associated 
outbreak in 1967, to more than 80% in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998-2000, to 
even higher in the outbreak that began in Angola in 
late 2004 (3,11). 
 
Prevention of Marburg Virus Infection  
MARV is a biosafety level-four agent (BSL-4), and 
thus requires the highest level of precautions (18). 
While over-reaction on the part of medical 
personnel is inappropriate and detrimental to both 
patient and staff, it is prudent to provide isolation 
measures as rigorous as feasible. At a minimum, 
these should include the following: stringent 
barrier nursing; mask, gown, glove, and needle 
precautions; hazard-labeling of specimens 
submitted to the clinical laboratory; restricted 
access to the patient; and autoclaving or liberal 
disinfection of contaminated materials, using 
hypochlorite or phenolic disinfectants (MARV is 
susceptible to 1% sodium hypochlorite, 2% 
gluteraldehyde or formaldehyde, ultraviolet light 
and heat). For more intensive care, however, 
increased precautions are advisable. Members of 
the patient care team should be limited to a small 
number of selected, trained individuals, and 
special care should be directed toward eliminating 
all parenteral exposures. Use of endoscopy, 
respirators, arterial catheters, routine blood 
sampling, and extensive laboratory analysis 
increase opportunities for aerosol dissemination 
of infectious blood and body fluids.  
A few research groups are working on vaccines to 
fight the virus. In 1998, a group at the United States 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (USAMRIID) published the first peer 
reviewed article detailing the development of the 
first experimental Marburg virus vaccine 
demonstrated to completely protect animals from 
lethal Marburg virus infection (19Hevey et al., 1998). 
Following this, in 2002, Genphar, a company doing 
research for the United States Army's biodefense 
program, announced that an experimental vaccine 
protected animals from a high dose of Marburg 
virus. The tests were conducted by USAMRIID. 
According to the company, all animals in the control 
group died within days whereas all animals that 
received the regular dosage of the vaccine were 
fully protected (8). 
Post-exposure Treatment of Marburg Virus 
Infection 
There is no specific antiviral therapy indicated for 
treating Marburg, and hospital care is usually 







require early administration of vasopressors and 
haemodynamic monitoring with attention to fluid 
and electrolyte balance, circulatory volume, and 
blood pressure. Viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
patients tend to respond poorly to fluid infusions 
and may develop pulmonary edema. (3,8). 
However, several attempts have been made to 
develop postexposure interventions against the 
filoviruses. Some degree of success has been 
achieved by using strategies that mitigate the 
coagulation abnormalities characterizing filoviral 
infection (20,28). Also, new postexposure treatment 
approaches, based on small interfering RNA (21) 
and antisense oligomers (22), have shown 
promising results in rodent models, but no reports 
have been published of evaluations of either 
strategy in the more stringent macaque models. 
In 2006, the first complete postexposure protection 
of nonhuman primates against a filovirus was 
reported. This was done by administering a live-
attenuated recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus 
(rVSV) vaccine vector expressing the MBGV 
glycoprotein (GP) (VSV∆G MBGV GP) shortly after 
a high-dose MBGV challenge (27). In a follow-up 
study to the one above, rhesus monkeys were 
protected from MARV disease when a recombinant 
vesicular stomatitis virus–based vaccine was 
administered 20 to 30 minutes after infection with 
Marburg virus. Five out of six (5/6) monkeys were 
protected when this vaccine was given 24 h after 
challenge, while 2/6 animals were protected when 
the vaccine was administered 48 h postinfection 
(22). 
 
More recently, results obtained from studies 
conducted by the U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases in collaboration with 
AVI BioPharma, a Washington-based biotechnology 
firm, have remained very promising for post-
exposure treatment of MARV infection. Their 
studies show that novel antisense therapies 
targeting specific viral genes protected monkeys 
infected with deadly Ebola or Marburg viruses, 
even when therapeutics were administered one 
hour after exposure—suggesting the approach 
holds promise for treating accidental infections in 
laboratory or hospital settings (23). 
 
Diagnosis of Marburg Virus Infection 
It should be kept in mind that the diagnosis of 
MARV infections will initially have to be based on 
clinical assessment (24). Clinicians should consider 
the diagnosis of Marburg VHF among febrile 
patients who, within 10 days before onset of fever, 
have either 1) traveled in northern Angola; 2) had 
direct contact with blood, other body fluids, 
secretions, or excretions of a person or animal 
suspected of having VHF; or 3) worked in a 
laboratory or animal facility that handles 
hemorrhagic fever viruses. The likelihood of 
acquiring VHF is considered extremely low in 
persons who do not meet any of these criteria. The 
cause of fever in persons who have traveled to areas 
where VHF is endemic is more likely to be a 
different infectious disease (11). When the identity 
of a VHF agent is totally unknown, isolation in cell 
culture and direct visualization by electron 
microscopy, followed by immunological 
identification by immunohistochemical techniques 
is often successful. Immunohistochemical 
techniques are also useful for retrospective 
diagnosis using formalin-fixed tissues, where viral 
antigens can be detected and identified using 
batteries of specific immune sera and monoclonal 
antibodies (24).  
 
Formal laboratory diagnosis requires a laboratory 
with special containment facilities (BL-4 
containment) (24). Antigen-capture enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) testing, IgM-capture 
ELISA, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and virus 
isolation can be used to confirm a case of Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever within a few days of the onset of 
symptoms. The IgG-capture ELISA is appropriate 
for testing persons later in the course of disease or 
after recovery. The disease is readily diagnosed by 
immunohistochemistry, virus isolation, or PCR of 
blood or tissue specimens from deceased patients 
(13, 14 ).  MARV grows well in a large variety of cell 
lines, although Vero or Vero E6 cells have been most 
used. The virus is relatively stable and may survive 
unfavorable handling and shipping (15 Sanchez et 
al., 2001). Diagnosis by viral cultivation and 
identification requires 3 to 10 days. However, viral 
isolation should not be attempted without BL-4 
containment (24). 
Weaponization and Bioterrorism 
The viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) agents, 
including MARV, are all highly infectious via the 
aerosol route, and most are quite stable as respirable 
aerosols. This means that they satisfy at least one 
criterion for being weaponized, and some clearly 
have the potential to be biological warfare threats 
(24). The former Soviet Union reportedly had a large 
biological weapons program involving Marburg. 
They developed a new strain, called "Variant U," 
which was successfully weaponized and approved 
by Soviet Ministry of Defense in 1990 (25). 
Bioterrorism grants in the United States are funding 
research to develop a vaccine for Marburg virus (8). 
Conclusion 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever is a very rare human 
disease. However, when it occurs, it has the 
potential to spread to other people, especially health 
care staff and family members who care for the 
patient. Increasing awareness, among health-care 
providers, of clinical symptoms in patients that 
suggest Marburg hemorrhagic fever is therefore 
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